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1 Introduction
The goal of surveillance is to detect or predict certain events, like accidents or illegal activities, by
continuously monitoring the position and behaviour of objects of interest. Those objects can, for in-
stance, be people, cars or ships. The monitoring requires the collection of information from various and
heterogeneous sources.
Typical sources employed in surveillance tasks, with respect to the detection of the object’s position
and movements (so-called kinematic data), are radars, transponders or optical sensors. Measurement
errors of such sensors can be characterised by statistical methods and fusing multiple independent sensors
can correct for those errors. A lot of work has already been done for automating this [8, 9, 13].
In addition to the kinematic analysis, objects need to be classified and identified. The goal is finally
to get to know whether an object is or will be involved in some relevant event. Evidence for this can be
given by an object’s behaviour, physical properties like size and type or involvement in past events. The
identity, which means objects’ names or identification numbers, is very valuable information as well, to
be able to link information from various sources to objects.
Gathering and handling those kind of non-kinematic information is a complex task, characterised by
a number of challenges:
• Information comes from different heterogeneous sources with possibly unknown characteristics.
Examples range from personal observations or communication of a human operator, performing a
surveillance task, to databases or websites. Information is provided in different formats, terminology
and might be contradicting. It is hard to judge how much one can trust a source. For instance,
social network websites might give very recent information one can not find somewhere else, but it
is hard to judge whether provided information is true or not.
• The amount of gathered information is unknown in advance. Whether and what information is
provided by the sources differs per object. Also the range of possible values one gets is unpredictable,
since many are strings like names.
• Wrong information is not only the result of random errors, but can also be due to intentional
misinformation. This makes it more difficult to characterise errors by statistical methods, since
the probability that information is correct depends on intentions of information providers. In
the current context, an intention is defined as a course of action that one has planned on and is
committed to follow.
• It is uncertain whether a piece of information provides information about an object of interest.
Information can not straightforwardly been put together, since it might not always be obvious
whether a piece of information tells something about the object one is interested in. This is especially
true because the identity of objects is virtually always uncertain. For instance, a source might give
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information about different objects if queried for either a number or the name, which are about
the same object according to another source. A query can even give multiple answers if different
objects can have the same name.
The sheer amount of information leads to information overload of human operators. Additionally, for
humans it is very hard to reason about uncertain information in a consistent, unbiased way. We are
therefore seeking for a way to support human surveillance operators by automating fusing information
and reasoning about it.
We tackle the problem by developing a probabilistic model to fuse information about objects under
surveillance. We found a probabilistic logic to be a suitable choice of modelling language in this research.
There are several reasons for choosing a first-order formalism, in contrast to a propositional formalism
such as Bayesian networks [12]. A first-order formalism allows to define abstract general rules, for
instance about properties of objects or reported evidence, without the need to define similar structures
for all possible instantiations. First-order rules also allow to deal with a number of evidence facts which
is unbounded and unknown in advance.
Another criterion is that the specific probabilistic logic language we use provides a natural way
to represent domain knowledge. This is important since in the domain we often lack sufficient data
with known ground truth we could learn models from. It is for instance virtually impossible to get a
data set of vessels indicating which one has actually been smuggling. We therefore want to be able
to incorporate domain knowledge and estimates for relation for which not sufficient data is available.
Specifically uncertainty is expressed as probabilities whose meaning can be interpreted locally and not
weights which only have a meaning in combination with weights of other rules (e.g. as in Markov logic [6]).
Furthermore, it has been shown that the distribution defined by a Markov logic theory depends on the
size of the domain [11], which is a major issue in the surveillance domain as the number of relevant
objects is not fixed in advance.
Surveillance tasks in the maritime context serve as a motivating example. Examples of information
important in this domain are vessel identities and types, smuggling events or whether a ship tries to hide
its identity. The contributions presented in this report are twofold.
Research:
• We develop a general framework of a model based on probabilistic logic for fusing non-kinematic
information. We take into account possible errors in the information, but also the uncertainty
whether information is about a particular object and propose a solution for dealing with attributes
having dynamic ranges of values.
• We show that intentions of objects can be handled in a systematic manner within the same frame-
work and that knowledge can guide and improve the fusing process.
Application:
• We apply our framework to build a model for decision support in maritime surveillance. and show
that the general rules can be extended with domain specific knowledge. We experimentally evaluate
the quality of the model’s results and support our claim that reasoning about intentions improves
the fusing process. A first prototype of the model has been integrated in a real-world setting, which
is the mission management system of our industrial partner1.
• To our knowledge this is one of the very few real-world applications of probabilistic logics in real-
world settings.
Fusing information requires that this information, using different representation formats and terminology,
is semantically aligned to a common information model. We do not tackle the issues related to this
preprocessing step in this research. For the purpose of this research we assume that all the information
is aligned to a common information model, e.g. the Maritime Information Exchange Model (MIEM)2.
In this report we first give an overview of the example domain, together with a scenario and the
basic idea of how human operators could be supported handling such scenarios in Section 2. We then
1http://www.thalesgroup.com
2https://www.niem.gov/communities/maritime
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in Section 3 introduce the knowledge representation language we use for building the model. Section 4
describes the general model structure together with examples of how maritime specific domain knowledge
can be represented. We then experimentally evaluate the model and support our basic claims in Section 5.
Finally, we discuss related work and conclude in Sections 6 and 7.
2 Maritime Surveillance
We first give a short introduction to the maritime domain and then give a scenario in which an operator
can be supported by our probabilistic model.
2.1 Domain
Vessels are identified by a number of basic properties:
• MMSI : a unique 9-digit Maritime Mobile Service Identity number, which may change over time.
• IMO : a unique 7-digit International Maritime Organization number, which is assigned only to
sea-going merchant ships of 100 gross tons and above, and it is fixed for the entire vessel’s lifetime.
• Name: an arbitrary string, which does not uniquely identify a vessel.
• Flag : the flag of the country where the vessel is registered. It can be derived from the first three
digits of the MMSI, the so-called Maritime identification digits (MID).
• Type: the vessels differ in size, the cargo they carry and waterways on which they navigate. Exam-
ples include dry bulk cargo, passenger, tanker.
Vessels provide such identification information along with their position using the Automatic Identifi-
cation System (AIS). Since the information send by AIS can be manipulated arbitrarily, in maritime
surveillance one cannot trust it, especially if the vessel has a reason to hide its identity. It can, however,
be evaluated using additional information from sources such as databases and websites. Examples include
IHS Fairplay3—a commercial database containing detailed vessel information, and marinetraffic.com—a
free-to-use website that provides real-time ship tracking information. Additional information might come
for instance from other operators via tactical chats or intelligence authorities.
As in surveillance in general, in the maritime domain intentions and behaviour of the objects of interest
play crucial role for detecting abnormal events. It is known, for example, that vessels being involved in
illegal activities, such as smuggling or hijacking, may try to hide their identity via vessel repainting on
sea. Evidence about those intentions influence how the information about vessel’s properties is judged.
A vessel that tries to hide its identity is not likely to transmit correct AIS information.
There is always uncertainty about the actual properties or intentions of the vessel, which complicates
the decision-making in the maritime domain. This is clearly illustrated in the next section, where we
introduce a scenario from the maritime domain, which is used as an example throughout this report.
2.2 Scenario
A coast guard operator has got an intelligence report that within two days a vessel named “Black Pearl”
is about to enter the zone under surveillance with smuggling goods on board. Therefore, the operator
starts examining carefully the vessels one by one within the area of interest. The problem is that there
can be multiple vessels with this name and the smuggling vessel might hide its identity by transmitting
a wrong name.
The operator examines the smuggling vessel, of course, not knowing that it is the smuggling one. The
vessel has the following true identity information, which is also unknown to the operator:
MMSI = 123456789, Name = “Black Pearl”
The vessel transmits an AIS message with the following information:
ais1 : MMSI = 123456789, Name = “Dutchman”
3http://www.ihs.com
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To verify this, the operator retrieves additional information from IHS Fairplay and marinetraffic.com:
fairplay1 : MMSI = 123456789, Name = “Black Pearl”
marinetraffic1 : MMSI = 987654321, Name = “Dutchman”
marinetraffic2 : MMSI = 123456789, Name = “Black Pearl”
There is obviously a contradiction between the names reported by AIS and by Fairplay, and there
might be several possible interpretations, e.g., (i) the vessel might send out a wrong name due to input
error or intentionally, (ii) the name in the Fairplay record is wrong or (iii) the MMSI send by the vessel
is wrong and the Fairplay record is about a different ship. The first marinetraffic.com record is likely
not to be about the vessel under examination, while the second one confirms the Fairplay information.
Given this information, the operator suspects that the vessel tries to hide its identity by sending a
wrong name, and thus it might be the vessel involved in smuggling. However, to verify this hypothesis
with certainty the operator requires a patrolling boat to visually observe the vessel at distance. The
information reported back is that the vessel has been repainted on sea, which gives the operator further
support to the hypotheses for hiding identity and smuggling of the vessel.
Although this scenario is a simplified version of the reality, it clearly illustrates the complexity of
maritime surveillance tasks, including retrieving and reasoning about information from heterogeneous
sources. This requires automated approaches to support human operators in their daily operational
work, where hundreds of ships and dozens of properties are to be examined. In this report we propose a
probabilistic model that makes a first step towards such automated support and in the next section we
illustrate the model’s working principles.
2.3 A Probabilistic Decision Support Model for Maritime Surveillance
Figure 1 presents an example scheme for the operational work of a maritime surveillance system with an
embedded decision-support model.
Hypothesis Probability
Vessel is smuggling 50%
Vessel hides identity 60%
Attribute Value Probability
MMSI 123456789 80%
987654321 10%
OTHER 10%
Name Dutchman 20%
Black Pearl 70%
OTHER 10%
. . . . . . . . .
Fusing Information
Attribute Distributions
Retrieving Information
Information Records
(Fairplay, marinetraffic.com)
AIS
(MMSI = 123456789,
Name = “Dutchman”)
Figure 1: Example Scenario
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Initially, the operator selects a single vessel of interest, whose AIS identity information, as given in the
scenario, is used to retrieve data from additional sources. The retrieved information serves as an input
to a probabilistic model for fusing the information. The result of the model is a probability distribution
of the vessel’s properties and its intentions given the obtained information. It is always possible that
the vessel’s true properties have values we do not observe or cannot retrieve. So the distribution of
all properties contain the special value OTHER, representing that case. The tables in Figure 1 present a
possible outcome from the model for the situation described in the scenario.
As described in the scenario, additional information like that the ship has been repainted gives evidence
for smuggling and lowers the trust in AIS. Adding this information therefore results in changes of all
probabilities shown in the tables.
3 Preliminaries
We use normal logic programs as representation language and add random variables to handle uncertainty.
3.1 Logic Programs
Our language is based on logic programs. We obey Prolog conventions: constants are starting with lower
case (e.g. tanker, ais, . . . ) and variables with upper case letters (Attr, Src, . . . ). The placeholder is
used for variables without name which are not referred to elsewhere. Terms consist of a functor and a
number of arguments. A logic program LP consists of rules, given by a head and body separated by ←.
Conjunction (∧) and disjunction (∨) are used as composition for building bodies. We additionally use
equality (=) and inequality ( 6=) operators for constants.
A query q succeeds in case it can be derived from the program. We formalise this with the following
indicator function:
success(q) =
{
1 if LP |= q
0 otherwise
(1)
EXAMPLE 1
Examples of rules are:
suspicious(V essel)← in fishing area(V essel) ∧ type(V essel, Type) ∧ Type 6= fishing
criminal(Person)← pirate(Person) ∨ smuggler(Person)
Under the assumption that pirate(person1) the query criminal(person1) is positively answered.
To make it more convenient to specify rules for special cases we introduce the notation ← [ to separate
head and body. This means that in case the rule matches, all rules defined after are not used. Note
that this does not destroy the declarative character of our language, it merely makes it unnecessary to
explicitly define the cases in which a general rules matches, which becomes impractical in case there are
a large number of special rules which should be used instead of the general one.
EXAMPLE 2
Assume there is a general rule for predicate p(V essel) and one wants to add a special rule for the “Black Pearl”. This can
be done like this:
p(black pearl)←[ . . .
p(V essel)← . . .
The same could be achieved without the ← [ notation:
p(black pearl)← . . .
p(V essel)← V essel 6= black pearl ∧ . . .
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3.2 Random Variables
We add random variables to our language to handle uncertainty. Random variables have a fixed number of
possible values with attached probabilities. Initially all random variables are independent, dependencies
are expressed by the structure of the logic program. In each possible world one single value is chosen for
each random variable. The current value of a random variables can be used within the logic program.
The syntax we use is similar to the one of distributional clauses (DC) [10], but we restrict it to
discrete, finite random variables in this research. Random variables are denoted starting with lower case
letters and can additionally have arguments, e.g. r or r(A1, . . . , AN ). A distributional clause defining
such random variables has the form r(A1, . . . , AN ) ∼ {p1 : c1, . . . , pN : cN} ← . . .. This defines a single
random variable with given distribution for each distinct grounding of A1, . . . , AN . The distribution may
depend on the body and therefore a different distribution can be computed for each grounding. We
assume a finite set of possible grounding, which means a program defines a finite set of random variables
we denote with the set V.
Finally, Random variables are used in clauses by mapping them to their value using the operator '.
For instance, a predicate p(X,Y ) that is true if random variable v(X) has value Y , can be defined as:
p(X,Y )←'v(X) = Y
EXAMPLE 3
Given that p(a, 0.6) and p(b, 0.2) are true and we define the following DC:
r(X) ∼ {P : v1, 1− P : v2} ← p(X,P )
This DC then defines the following two random variables in case q is 'r( ) = v1:
r(a) ∼ {0.6 : v1, 0.4 : v2}
r(b) ∼ {0.2 : v1, 0.8 : v2}
In case the query is 'r(a) = v1 only the first random variable r(a) is in the set of random variables Vq .
Such random variables can naturally represent exclusive states, like the properties we consider which
can have only one value at a time. For instance, a vessel has only one identification number. In that
sense they are similar to logic programs with annotated disjunctions [16].
In this research we enforce the additional constraints to make sure that the probabilities of all possible
values a random variable can take sum up to one. The same constraint is enforced for instance in Bayesian
networks. To achieve this, first the probabilities p1, . . . , pN in each definition {p1 : c1, . . . , pN : cN} must
sum up to one. Second, in case another random variable is used in the bodies of rules defining that
random variable, the rules must be exclusive and exhaustively cover all possible values of that other
random variable.
EXAMPLE 4
Given this definition of q:
q ∼ {0.5 : a, 0.5 : b}
A proper definition of p could be:
p ∼ {0.9 : a, 0.1 : b} ←'q = a
p ∼ {0.2 : a, 0.8 : b} ←'q = b
We do not use definitions with one rule missing in this research.
3.3 Query Success Probability
We define the probability P (q) that a query q succeeds. We start defining the probability of a single
complete choice of all random variables. Such a choice c is a function which selects a probability-value
pair (p : v) for each element of V.
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A logic program PLc can be assigned to each choice, in which all DCs are replaced by a rule. The
head of such a rule assigns a value to the random variable. The DC r(A1, . . . , AN ) ∼ {p1 : c1, . . . , pN :
cN} ← . . . is replaced by 'r(A1, . . . , AN ) = v ← . . . where (p : v) = c(r).
The probability of a choice Pc is the product of all probabilities in the choice, since we assume them
to be independent:
Pc =
∏
r∈V, c(r)=(p:v)
p (2)
The probability of a query P (q) is finally defined by the sum of the probabilities of all possible choices for
which q can be derived from PLc. We denote the set of all possible choices with C and use the indicator
function csuccess(q, c), meaning that query q can be derived under the choice c:
csuccess(q, c) =
{
1 if LPc |= q
0 otherwise
(3)
The success probability of a query is finally defined as:
P (q) =
∑
c∈C
Pc · csuccess(q, c) (4)
3.4 Conditional Success Probabilities
One usually does not only want to know the success probability of a query for the general case, but
wants to use evidence about a particular case to update that probability. For instance, one wants the
probability that an object has a certain property, given the available information about it.
We therefore want to compute the probability of the query q given evidence e, denoted by P (q|e).
The probability can be defined using basic probability theory:
P (q|e) = P (q ∧ e)
P (e)
(5)
The two separate probabilities are defined as done before.
3.5 Syntactic Sugar
We use some syntactic sugar to denote special finite distributions for readability:
constant(C) ≡ {1.0 : C}
uniform({V1, . . . , VN}) ≡ { 1
N
: V1, . . . ,
1
N
: VN}
uniform other({V1, . . . , VN},M) ≡ { 1
M
: V1, . . . ,
1
M
: VN ,
M −N
M
: other}
flip(P ) ≡ {P : true, 1− P : false}
combination({w1 : Dist1, . . . , wN : DistN}) ≡ w1 ·Dist1 ∪ . . . ∪ wN ·DistN
The special distribution uniform other represents a uniform distribution over M possible states of which
only V1, . . . , VN are known. All other possible, unknown values are represented by other. The distribution
combination is used to combine different distributions and weight them according to the given weights.
Multiplication of a weight with a distribution means multiplying all probabilities in the distribution with
the weight.
4 Probabilistic Model
The goal of our probabilistic model is to reason about intrinsic properties and intentions of objects given
information records as evidence. We first describe how we represent objects and their properties and
intentions and information records. Then we model the dependency between them, making it possible to
reason about what given information records tell about the object’s actual properties and intentions.
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4.1 Objects and Attributes
We assume there is a set of uniform objects in the real world we are interested in. In the maritime
surveillance domain, such objects are typically vessels. We refer to the single object we are currently
interested in as object of interest (OoI) and denote it with the special constant ooi. This allows us to
model properties and intentions, and the information about them in the same uniform way.
As discussed, in surveillance tasks we are interested in both the intrinsic properties and intentions of
objects. For vessels these can be the name, MMSI, type or intention for smuggling. Although properties
and intentions of objects are semantically different, from a modelling point of view in this research we do
not make a distinction between them and refer to both as attributes. For instance, a record from a vessel
database and an intelligence report that a ship with a certain name is smuggling can be expressed using
the same representation.
Attributes behave like functions, which means each object attribute can only have one value at a time.
We therefore represent the value of a single attribute Attr or object Obj as a single random variable:
attr(Obj,Attr) (6)
EXAMPLE 5
The attributes of the OoI from the running example (Section 2.2) are represented as:
'attr(ooi,mmsi) = 123456789
'attr(ooi, name) = “Black Pearl”
Each attribute has a domain, which means the possible values it can take. We distinguish between
fixed and dynamic domain. The first case applies to attributes with a domain which can be enumerated
straightforwardly. Examples are a vessel’s type or whether the vessel is smuggling. That the fixed domain
of attribute Attr consists of values v1, . . . , vN is represented as:
domain(Attr, fixed({v1, . . . , vN}))
There are however attributes for which a fixed domain makes no sense or would result in a model for
which inference is infeasible. This is either because all values can theoretically be enumerated but this
enumeration would be too large, like for identification numbers of fixed size, or because the possible values
are not all known, like for names. Such dynamic domains are represented as follows:
domain(Attr, dynamic({known1, . . . , knownK}, N))
The first part is a set of values known1, . . . , knownK for which it is known that the attribute can take them
for a particular case. They are determined dynamically based on the information reported. Additionally,
there is the estimated number of distinct values in the actual domain. The possible number of distinct
identification numbers of fixed size could in principle be derived exactly, but not all numbers may be in
use in the real world. So a better estimation can be given.
EXAMPLE 6
The domains of the type attribute and the attribute telling whether a ship is repainted are fixed and represented as:
domain(type, fixed({cargo, tanker, passenger, . . .}))
domain(smuggling, fixed([true, false]))
Given the reported information from the running Example (Section 2.2) the dynamically computed domains would be:
domain(mmsi, dynamic({123456789, 987654321}, 1000000))
domain(name, dynamic({“BlackPearl”, “Dutchman”}, 500000))
For each attribute finally a prior distribution has to be defined. Those distributions represent the
prior distribution of attribute values independent of the object or any further knowledge about it. We
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distinguish between unconditional prior distributions and conditional distributions depending on another
attribute’s value.
Unconditional prior distributions are simple prior estimates of the distribution of values objects in
the domain take for a particular attribute. This can straightforwardly be expressed for attributes with
fixed domain:
attr( , Attr) ∼ {p1 : v1, . . . , pN : VN}
The prior distribution for attributes with dynamic domain can be derived from that domain. In the
common case we assume the probability is uniformly distributed over all values and we use the distribution
uniform other as described in Section 3.5. We only need a single default rule for this case:
attr( , Attr) ∼ uniform other(V alues,N)← domain(Attr, dynamic(V alues,N))
EXAMPLE 7
The prior probability for smuggling can simply be expressed as:
attr( , smuggling) ∼ flip(0.01)
A special case is the IMO, since it is not assigned to all vessels. This can be expressed with a combination of the dynamic
distribution with a constant distribution of value noIMO:
attr( , imo) ∼ combination({0.3 : uniform other(V alues,N), 0.7 : constant(noIMO)})
←[ domain(Attr, dynamic(V alues,N))
Conditional prior distributions are used to express dependencies between attributes. The formalism
allows to define directed causal relationships without circles. Those distributions are defined with rules
like:
attr(Obj,Attr) ∼ Dist← Body
Here Body can be any clause defining a prior distribution Dist. The distribution can dynamically be
defined conditioned on values of other attributes.
EXAMPLE 8
The probability that is vessel is hiding its identity is much higher in case it is smuggling. This can be expressed by:
attr(Obj, hides identity) ∼ flip(0.7) ←'attr(Obj, smuggling) = true
attr(Obj, hides identity) ∼ flip(0.01)←['attr(Obj, smuggling) = false
Again a ← [ is used to prevent the general rules, which has to be defined after, to match.
An example of a conditional distribution for an attribute with dynamic domain is a vessel’s flag. It can be derived from
the MMSI. To reflect the the prior distribution can be defined as:
attr(Obj, flag) ∼ constant(Flag) ← [ 'attr(Obj,mmsi) = MMSI ∧ MMSI 6= other ∧ mmsi flag(MMSI, F lag)
In case the MMSI is a concrete number the flag can be derived from it. We assume we have the predicate mmsi flag(MMSI, F lag)
to do this. In case the MMSI is other the default rules is used.
4.2 Information Records
We refer to information reported by sources as information records, or records for short. Formally, a
record Rec reported by a source Src is represented as follows:
source(Rec, Src)
We use the convention that the label of each record contains the source name with an attached number
ID, e.g. a record with a label intel1 means that it is provided by an intelligence report with an ID of 1.
In the maritime scenario such records are for instance ais1, fairplay1 and marinetraffic1(2).
Each record contains values for a number of attributes. We introduce a random variable to represent
the value of an attribute Attr reported in a record Rec:
rec attr(Rec,Attr)
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The fact that values are missing (not reported) can itself be useful input information for the probabilis-
tic model. How to represent that is itself a complex modelling task where different types of missingness
need to be considered, e.g., whether a value is not known or it is known but just not reported. While
this is a valuable research direction, for the purpose of this research, we focus only the values available
(reported) in a record.
EXAMPLE 9
Some representations of the information reported about the vessel from the example in Section 2.2 are:
'rec attr(intel1, smuggling) = true
'rec attr(ais1, name) = “Dutchman”
'rec attr(fairplay1,mmsi) = 123456789
'rec attr(visualsign1, repainted) = true
4.3 Establishing A Relation Between Objects & Information Records
The goal of the model is finally to predict the OoI’s true attributes using information records. This is
done by establishing probabilistic relationships between the object and record attributes based on domain
knowledge. A schematic representation of this relation is given in Figure 2.
Obj2
Attr1 Attr2 Attr3
c 10 d
Obj1
Attr1 Attr2 Attr3
a 15 b
a 12 b
Attr1 Attr2 Attr3
Rec1
a − b
Attr1 Attr2 Attr3
Rec2
e 10 d
Attr1 Attr2 Attr3
Rec3
Src1 Src2
correct observation
error observation
reports
Figure 2: Relation between object & records attributes
As mentioned earlier, a source Src reports one or more records Reci, and we assume that each record
is always related to a single object Obj. For example, in the figure Rec1 and Rec2 are about Obj1 and
Rec3 is about Obj2. Attribute values in records are observations of the object’s actual attribute values,
but records do not have to provide values for all attributes. Rec2 for instance does not provide a value
for attribute Attr2. Records can report erroneous attribute values, which means that the value is not
equal to the observed object’s actual one. For instance, Rec1 is about Obj1 and reports 12 for Attr2,
although the attribute’s actual value for that object is 10.
We define a binary random variable to indicate whether or not a record attribute is erroneous:
error(Rec,Attr)
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We define a default probability distribution pd for the error, which is independent of the record or
attribute:
error( , ) ∼ flip(pd).
Again special rules are possible, to for instance express that we judge the error rate of records from
certain sources different. Also more complex dependencies can be expressed.
EXAMPLE 10
Assume we judge the error rate of all records from the Fairplay database to be less than the default. This can be expressed
by a special case for error:
error(Rec, ) flip(0.02)←[ source(Rec, fairplay)
AIS messages are handled in a special way. They are certainly about the OoI sends they are sent out by them. In case the
OoI is hiding its identity it will certainly send out a wrong name, since the name is always mentioned in news articles and
other reports. There is also a high chance that a wrong MMSI and IMO is sent. There are not many reasons to hide other
attributes like the type, since it cannot be used to identity a vessel:
error(ais, name) ∼ constant(true)← [ attr(ooi, hides identity, true)
error(ais,mmsi) ∼ flip(0.6)← [ attr(ooi, hides identity, true)
error(ais, imo) ∼ flip(0.7)← [ attr(ooi, hides identity, true)
error(ais, ) ∼ flip(0.1)← [ attr(ooi, hides identity, true)
error(ais, ) ∼ flip(0.05)← [ attr(ooi, hides identity, false)
The object a record contains observations about is formalised by the random variable which is defined
for each record Rec:
about(Rec)
We make the assumption that each record is either about the ooi or about one of the set of other objects.
For each record we introduce an additional object the record is potentially about. The probability pooi
that a record is about the OoI is one divided by the estimated total number of objects. That the record
is about the other object has a very high probability consequently, since it represents the choice of the
proper object from the set of all other ones. We define the following default rule for about. To introduce
the additional object we use the record label as object label:
about(Rec) ∼ {pooi : ooi, 1− pooi : Rec}
As for other rules also special cases can be expressed.
EXAMPLE 11
The AIS message and visual observations are certainly about the OoI. This can be expressed by the special rule:
about(Rec) ∼ constant(ooi)←[ source(Rec, ais) ∨ source(Rec, visualsign)
We can finally define rules for the relation between object and record attributes. There are two cases:
the records correctly reports the attribute’s value or not. In the first case the reported value is determin-
istically defined and it equals the true attribute value. It is formally represented as:
rec attr(Rec,Attr) ∼ constant('attr(Obj,Attr))←
'error(Rec,Attr) = false ∧ 'about(Rec) = Obj
For the second case when the value is erroneously reported the error distribution has to be determined
dynamically based on the attribute’s domain:
rec attr(Rec,Attr) ∼ Dist←
'error(Rec,Attr) = true ∧ 'about(Rec) = Obj
∧ error dist(Attr,'attr(Obj,Attr), Dist)
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The predicate error dist(Attr, V alue,Dist) computes a distribution for erroneous information, given that
V alue is the attribute’s real value. We define the error distribution of an attribute with fixed domain as
uniform distribution above all possible values except the correct one:
error dist(Attr, V alue, uniform(V alues \ {V alue}))← domain(Attr, fixed(V alues))
The false information distribution for attribute with dynamic domain is defined analogously, by filtering
out the correct value and then using the already discussed distribution uniform other:
error dist(Attr, V alue, uniform other(V alues \ {V alue}, N))← domain(Attr, dynamic(V alues,N))
4.4 Application to the Scenario
We apply our model to the scenario described in Section 2.2. The evidence e we have is formalised as:
'rec attr(ais,mmsi) = 123456789∧ 'rec attr(ais, name) = “Dutchman”∧
'rec attr(fairplay1,mmsi) = 123456789∧ 'rec attr(fairplay1, name) = “BlackPearl”∧
'rec attr(mtraffic1,mmsi) = 987654321∧ 'rec attr(mtraffic1, name) = “Dutchman”∧
'rec attr(mtraffic2,mmsi) = 123456789∧ 'rec attr(mtraffic2, name) = “BlackPearl”
We compute probabilities for the relevant queries with this evidence e and with the additional visual
observation that the vessel has been repainted e′ = e∧ 'rec attr(visualsign1, repainted) = true. The
following table gives an overview of the rounded probabilities. Probabilities of 0.00000 do not indicate
an impossibility, but are rounded very small probabilities:
Query P (q|e) P (q|e′)
'attr(ooi,mmsi) = 123456789 0.99996 0.99995
'attr(ooi,mmsi) = 987654321 0.00000 0.00000
'attr(ooi,mmsi) = other 0.00004 0.00005
'attr(ooi, name) = “Dutchman” 0.00068 0.00031
'attr(ooi, name) = “BlackPearl” 0.99927 0.99962
'attr(ooi, name) = other 0.00005 0.00007
'attr(ooi, smuggling) = true 0.05501 0.24912
'attr(ooi, hides identity) = true 0.12638 0.59849
The results quantitatively confirms the intuitive line of reasoning sketched in the scenario. The
vessel seems to send the wrong name “Dutchman” in order to hide its identity. The model gives a low
probability for that name, which decreases even more with additional visual evidence that the ship has
been repainted. As expected, the probabilities for smuggling and that the vessel tries to hide its identity
increase with the added evidence.
Quantitatively the probabilities might seems somewhat extreme. The reason for that is that we assume
all information records to be independent observations of the object. Two independent observations of
an event with a very low probability, like that a ship has a certain identification number, gives very
high probability that it is the actual number. In other words, the probability that two observations are
erroneous and accidentally report the same wrong identification number is very small.
In practice observations may not be that independent, since source may not provide information based
on direct observations of the real object. They may get and aggregate information from other sources.
How to model and discover such dependencies remains future work.
5 Experiments
We experimentally evaluated our approach using simulated vessel data. We simulated a dataset with
150 vessels, according to the prior distributions defined in the model. We assume that in the model we
exactly know the characteristics of the data, e.g. the probability that a record is about the OoI is 1/150
and the error rate of all sources is known. In this first experiment we restrict to the attributes MMSI,
IMO and name and do not deal with intentions. Note that only 30% of the vessels have an IMO, the rest
have value noIMO for that attribute.
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The aim is to check whether our model can correct for errors in AIS data. We used the model to
predict a value for each attribute by selecting the value with the highest probability which is not other.
We then determined the error rate per attribute by comparing to the actual value. For each vessel we
simulated AIS messages with error rate varying from 0 to 1. We used the same error rate for all attributes.
We further simulated for each vessel records for the Fairplay database and a website with fixed error
rate of 0.02 and 0.03 respectively. All records having the same MMSI, IMO or name as the AIS message
were used as evidence. Since the attributes can be reported erroneously in all information records it is
possible that multiple records include the same MMSI, IMO or name. The number of records used was
therefore dynamic.
The result is illustrated in Figure 3. The predictions made by the model are significantly less erroneous
than the AIS information alone.
Figure 3: Experiment result
The performance for the MMSI and the name is virtually the same. The fact that the MMSI uniquely
identifies a vessel and the name not, plays no role in the data simulated for this small number of vessels.
In case the error rate gets too high the model cannot correct errors for the MMSI and name any more.
For the IMO the model performs much better, which is not surprising given that the model contains
the knowledge that only 30% of the vessels have an IMO. Simply always predicting noIMO would result
in a error rate of only 0.3.
The model could in the experiment correct for all errors in case the error rate is around 0.05, which is
an error rate not expected to be higher in practice. As in practice we do not know the true distribution
of the data, the results cannot be interpreted as the performance the approach would have in a realistic
setting. Still, it is a promising first result showing the potential of this technique.
6 Related Work
Waltz and Llinas call make the distinction between “low-level processing” and “high-level processing” [17]
also referred to as ‘low-level information fusion” (LLIF) and “high-level information fusion” (HLIF)
respectively. While LLIF is about fusing information from sensors, HLIF deals with behaviour and
intents.
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For movement data probabilistic methods have successfully been applied to fuse data from sensors,
e.g. [8]. It has also been shown that anomalies and possible behaviour can be recognised [9, 13] which
supports HLIF. Despite the encouraging results obtained, this research is highly restricted to movement
data reported from sensors, which limits their capability to detect or predict relevant events.
We further focus on work for non-movement attributes as discussed in this report. There are some re-
sults already showing the potential of applying first-order probabilistic formalisms to support surveillance
tasks. While the way how those approaches tackle the problem of representing uncertainty in domain
knowledge is very similar to out work, to our knowledge all work in this area is restricted to mostly HLIF
tasks.
A system for situational awareness that explicitly represents uncertainty in a probabilistic manner
is proposed in [1]. The reasoning mechanism is based on Multy-Entity Bayesian Networks (MEBN)–a
first-order Bayesian logic formalism. A realistic scenario shows the flexible, distributed and probabilistic
nature of the proposed approach. There is further work based on MEBNs or Markov logic to represent
maritime domain knowledge and reason about vessel’s intents [2, 4, 14, 6]. An interesting approach of
how to reason about intentions, taking into account the behaviour of vessels over a period of time is
presented in [7]. An example of similar work outside of the maritime domain is [15].
In contrast to this work, we also deal with LLIF of information about intrinsic properties, like names,
and show that the synergy between LLIF and HLIF can improve the results of both. Furthermore, our
work provides a general, domain-independent core model we believe to be applicable to a wide range of
tasks and use the maritime domain only as example.
Finally, research has been done about how to represent and align information in complex and uncertain
domains, by means of so called ontologies. Research in this field aims at extending existing ontology
formalisms with uncertainty [5, 3]. Also the work already discussed above partially deals with that issue
(e.g. [1, 2]). While we abstract from that this problem in our research and assume all information used
is semantically aligned using a fixed set of attributes, ontology research lays the basis for being able to
automatically reason about information.
7 Conclusions
We developed a framework to fuse information about intrinsic properties and intentions of objects under
surveillance. The framework is based on a probabilistic logic. This representation allows us to deal with
the dynamic amount of information in the domain and dynamic ranges of attributes which are unknown
in advance. The formalism furthermore allows to represent knowledge in a way that makes relationships
between entities and also the attached probabilistic knowledge locally interpretable.
We further show how our approach can be applied to build a model for maritime surveillance by
adding domain specific knowledge to the general framework. To our knowledge this is one of the very few
real-world applications of probabilistic logics in real-world settings. We finally experimentally show that
our model can correct for errors in information transmitted by simulated vessels by fusing this information
with information from other sources.
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